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JUVENILE OFFENDERS: VICTIMS OF CIRCUMSTANCE WITH A 





Over the past fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has 
examined and reexamined the question of how to treat children1 in the 
criminal justice system.2  The Court has frequently held that children are 
entitled to many of the same due process rights as adults.3  Nevertheless, the 
Court has also opined that, “from a developmental standpoint, [children] are 
different from adults, which greatly impacts how courts should treat them in 
a whole host of areas.”4  Although these historical inconsistencies are not 
easily reconciled, over the past decade, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged three fundamental characteristics of youth: (1) lack of 
maturity, (2) vulnerability to negative influences, and (3) capacity for 
change.5  These fundamental characteristics, the Court has explained, make 
children “constitutionally different” from adults and “less deserving of the 
most severe punishments.”6  Cumulatively, these cases represent the 
Court’s “kids are different” sentencing jurisprudence.7  
 
∗ Andrea B. Huerta, J.D. Candidate 2017.  I would like to thank the faculty and staff at FIU College of 
Law for fostering such a professional and academically-encouraging environment. In addition, I would 
like to thank Professor Kotey and Professor Moreno for guiding me throughout my research and 
motivating me along the way. Finally, thank you to the FIU Law Review Executive Board and Staff for 
all your hard work in making this publication possible.  
1  This Note follows the lead of Justice Kagan in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and 
uses the words “children” and “juvenile” interchangeably. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
2  United States Supreme Court Juvenile Justice Jurisprudence, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., 
http://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/united-states-supreme-court-juvenile-justice-jurisprudence/ 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (summarizing the cases that describe the United States Supreme Court’s 
major jurisprudence in the area of juvenile justice). 
3  Id. 
4  See id. (For further information on the cases in which the Supreme Court has previously treated 
juveniles differently regarding their waiver of rights, culpability, and punishment). 
5  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458, 2464; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) 
(holding the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 
(2010) (holding that life without parole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violates the Eighth 
Amendment). 
6  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding the juvenile death 
penalty violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding that life without parole 
sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment). 
7  Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 929, 937 (2015). 
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Recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that 
sentencing juvenile offenders to mandatory life without the possibility of 
parole (“LWOP”) violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.8  The juvenile justice community praised this decision, 
characterizing it as a “historic” decision.9  Although this was a step in the 
right direction for juvenile offenders, it was, nevertheless, just a step.10  In 
Miller, the Court squandered a real opportunity;11 it expressly limited its 
decision to only prohibiting the mandatory imposition of LWOP sentences 
for juvenile offenders, rather than prohibiting the imposition of all LWOP 
sentences for juvenile offenders.12  Thus, after Miller, it is still 
constitutionally permissible for juveniles to be sentenced to LWOP so long 
as the sentencer provides the juvenile with an individualized consideration 
at sentencing.13 
This Note will begin with a brief historical overview of the juvenile 
justice system in the United States.  More specifically, this Note will 
explain the “kids are different” rationale.  This Note continues by offering 
an explanation for the Court’s incremental and minimalistic behavior, and 
argues that although judicial minimalism may be appropriate in some areas, 
it is not appropriate in the realm of juvenile justice.  Accordingly, this Note 
will use the Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama to explain how judicial 
minimalism serves no purpose in the realm of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to cases involving children.  In 
support of my argument, this Note will provide an analysis of the decision 
in Miller v. Alabama, to establish that although the Court correctly 
prohibited mandatory LWOP, it erred when it failed to prohibit all LWOP 
sentences for juvenile offenders.  Furthermore, this Note will explain 
Miller’s effect on the juvenile justice system and the importance of 
resolving the tension that exists between justice, efficiency, and fairness.  
Specifically, as it relates to the “fundamental disconnect” between how 
 
8  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
9  See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Bans Mandatory Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Children 
Convicted of Homicide, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (June 25, 2012), http://eji.org/news/supreme-court-
bans-mandatory-life-without-parole-sentences-for-children-miller-v-alabama. 
10  Sean Craig, infra note 32, at n.195 (explaining how Executive Director Bryan Stevenson of 
the Equal Justice Institute, who represented both defendants in Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, hailed the 
Supreme Court’s holding as “an important win for children” and “a significant step forward”); see also 
U.S. Supreme Court Bans Mandatory Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Children Convicted of 
Homicide, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (June 25, 2012), http://eji.org/node/646. 
11  See David R. Dow, Don’t Believe the Hype: Supreme Court Decision on Juvenile Life Without 
Parole is Weak, DAILY BEAST (June 25, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06 
/25/don-t-believe-the-hype-supreme-court-decision-on-juvenile-life-without-parole-is-weak.html. 
12  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
13  Id. 
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“kids are different,” and how the juvenile justice system currently 
functions.  This section will explore national and global tensions 
surrounding sentencing juveniles to LWOP.  As to the former, this Note 
attempts to explain the difficulty lower courts have experienced in 
attempting to construe the Miller decision.  As to the latter, this Note 
highlights the international community’s disapproval towards the United 
States in sentencing juveniles to LWOP. 
This Note concludes by explaining how the juvenile justice system is 
currently facing an opportunity for major reform.  This Note proffers that it 
is in the best interest of our nation, and society as a whole, for this change 
to take effect.  As a result, the Supreme Court must change its approach in 
deciding cases involving juvenile offenders, especially as it relates to 
sentencing them.  Nevertheless, this Note offers various alternatives that 
exist in resolving this issue. Moreover, this Note suggests that in order for 
this reform to take effect, all three branches of the government, as well as 
school authorities and law enforcement agencies, must come together with 
one clear focus: rehabilitate juvenile offenders while also ensuring the 
safety of communities. 
 
 THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A DIZZYING PACE OF REFORM:   
 FROM “INNOCENT CHILDREN” TO “HYPER-VIOLENT, MORALLY- 
 DEPRAVED YOUTH” 
 
The juvenile justice system in the United States has experienced a 
roller coaster, which has resulted in a dizzying pace of reform.14  The first 
juvenile court was established in Chicago, Illinois, in 1899.15  Since then, 
the juvenile justice system has been reformed four times; these four periods 
of reform have been characterized as follows: (1) the rehabilitative model; 
(2) the due process reforms; (3) getting tough on juvenile offenders; and (4) 
a window of opportunity for rethinking juvenile justice.16  This reform is 
primarily attributable to the significant role that scientific research has 
played in influencing attitudes and shaping policies and programs.17  
Surprisingly, however, one may wonder how the principle of treating 
children differently from adults only became relevant to the Supreme Court 
 
14  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); see also Marsha Levick, The Pendulum 
Swings, Looking Back at More than a Century of Juvenile Justice Reform in the United States, 296 N.J. 
LAW. 11 (2015). 
15  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL 
APPROACH 31 (Richard J. Bonnie, et al. eds., 2013). 
16  See id. at 31–33. 
17  See id. at 45. 
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in the past decade, when this idea predates to the American Revolution.18  
“The political philosopher John Locke argued that children’s . . . [inability 
to reason], [which] disqualifie[s] them from participating in [the] 
government, also ma[kes] them less culpable for their criminal acts.”19  By 
the 20th century, this principle was embedded into the foundation of the 
world’s first juvenile courts.20 
The juvenile justice system was established as an alternative system to 
the adult criminal system, whereby it focused on individualized 
rehabilitation and treatment, civil jurisdiction, informal procedure, and 
separate incapacitation.21  It was built around an idealized vision of young 
offenders as “innocent children.”22  Accordingly, the first juvenile courts 
functioned more like social welfare agencies than institutions of justice, 
with rehabilitation and youth guidance as their primary objectives.23  
Nevertheless, in the late 1960s, it appeared that the juvenile justice system 
was too aspirational and was not providing juvenile offenders with 
sufficient procedural protections.24  This initiated the second period of 
reform, where juveniles began receiving more procedural protections.25  For 
example, in 1967, the Supreme Court decided in In re Gault that juvenile 
offenders are entitled to the same protections under the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment that is given to adult criminal offenders.26 
However, the third period of reform was triggered in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, when juvenile (homicide) crime rates reached a temporary 
peak, which the media categorized as “hyper-violent, morally-depraved, 
and criminally-involved youth, who were out to terrorize society.”27  
 
18  David S. Tanehaus, Op-Ed., The Roberts Court’s Liberal Turn on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-roberts-courts-liberal-turn-on-
juvenile-justice.html?_r=0 (noting that individualized justice for children was one of the ideals of 
juvenile court). 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  See Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and 
Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 98 (2013). 
22  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 136–37. 
23  See generally JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK 
ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, (Thomas Grisso and Robert G. Schwartz eds. 1992) [hereinafter 
YOUTH ON TRIAL]. 
24  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 35 (explaining that juvenile offenders had 
no right to an attorney, and the informal hearings in which their guilt was determined lacked the rigorous 
evidentiary protections of a criminal trial). 
25  See id. 
26  See id. (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
27  See id. at 38; see also Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 14, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 
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Concerns for public safety trumped concerns for due process or the 
constitutional rights of juvenile offenders.28  As a result, states began 
adopting harsher punishments for juvenile offenders.29  Accordingly, 
juvenile courts were divested of jurisdiction and punitive sanctions began 
replacing treatment and rehabilitation.30  Consequently, the courts began 
transferring juvenile offenders to the adult criminal court system much 
more frequently.  As a result, these juvenile offenders began facing the full 
brunt of adult punishment, receiving not only lengthy sentences, but also 
sentences of LWOP, and even death.31  This “fast track to [a] states’ 
harshest criminal penalties,” barely resembles any remnants from the 
original juvenile justice system.32 
In 1996, in an effort to understand this dramatic change, the 
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and 
Juvenile Justice (“MacArthur Foundation”) examined the United States 
juvenile justice system through the lens of developmental psychology.33  By 
carefully reviewing and analyzing both law and science, the MacArthur 
Foundation demonstrated that a fair and enlightened juvenile justice system 
must consider the developmental and psychological facts of adolescence.34  
Upon exploring the differences between adults and children, the study 
concluded that when children serve as criminal defendants, they are at a 
severe disadvantage because (1) children do not have the same abilities as 
adults to participate in the trial process, and (2) children should not be held 
to the same level of accountability as adults when they break the law.35  As 
to the former, it is critical that a defendant in a criminal trial not only have 
the ability to assist his or her legal counsel, but also be able to participate in 
the decision-making process.36  This is especially important in making 
decisions that are crucial to a juvenile offender’s defense.37  However, the 
study found that children are less likely to trust adults, which makes it more 
 
10-9647), 2012 WL 135045 [hereinafter Brief for NAACP]. 
28  Brief for NAACP at 14. 
29  Id. at 9. 
30  See Brief for NAACP, supra note 27, at 10; see Levick, supra note 14, at 12. 
31  Levick, supra note 14, at 12. 
32  Sean Craig, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road Towards 
a Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 384 (2013); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 
(2010) (explaining that LWOP is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile offenders). 
33  See YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 23 (explaining that developmental psychology is a science 
that challenges the current presumption that children somehow stop being children when they commit 
crimes). 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
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difficult for the attorney representing them to gain their trust.38 
Moreover, the study discovered that most children do not understand 
the concept and meaning of a “legal right.”39  The choices children make 
are all affected by their emotional and cognitive immaturity, susceptibility 
to peer pressure, and their perceptions and attitudes concerning risk.40  
Accordingly, how juvenile offenders make decisions supports the 
conclusion that they are less responsible than adult offenders in similar 
situations.41  This is primarily because children do not have the same level 
of competence or culpability as adults, and thus, should be treated 
accordingly in our juvenile justice system; hence, the notion behind “kids 
are different.” 
In 2005, this research took center stage in Roper v. Simmons, where 
the Supreme Court relied on scientific and sociological data, to find it 
unconstitutional for juvenile offenders to be sentenced to death.42  In Roper, 
the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment applied to the death penalty 
with special force because it is the most severe punishment an offender can 
receive.43  Five years later, the Court reaffirmed this “kids are different” 
principle in Graham v. Florida, where it found that a LWOP sentence for a 
juvenile, who did not commit murder is unconstitutional.44  In Graham, the 
Court reasoned that LWOP “is an especially harsh punishment for a 
juvenile” because “[u]nder this sentence, a juvenile offender will on 
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than 
an adult offender.”45  The Court analogized LWOP sentences to death 
sentences, explaining that in both sentences, the offender will die in 
prison.46  Thus, a LWOP sentence imposed on a juvenile, and a LWOP 
sentence imposed on an adult, is essentially only the same in name.47  
Recently, in Miller, the Court held that sentencing juveniles to a mandatory 
LWOP is unconstitutional.48  Notably, the juvenile justice system appears to 
be slowly coming full circle, where we currently find ourselves in the fourth 
 
38  Id. 
39  See YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 23. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70 (2005). 
43  Id. at 568. 
44  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70–71 (2010).  
45  Id. at 70. 
46  See id. 
47  See id. 
48  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2485 (2012); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 
S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (finding the holding in Miller announced a new substantive rule that was 
retroactive in cases on collateral review). 
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stage of reform, the “Window of Opportunity for Rethinking the Juvenile 
Justice System.”49 
 
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
 
The Eight Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”50  
In these cases, the Justices must figure out how to interpret the meaning of 
the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment.”51  The issues that arise in this 
context illustrate how the Court often engages in incremental decision-
making, where it tends to limit its ruling only to the circumstances of each 
case, and one step at a time.52  Moreover, in these cases, the Court often 
looks to its decision in Trop v. Dulles, which is considered the benchmark 
case for understanding the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment.”53  
According to Trop, the Court must decide whether the punishment violates 
the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”54  Accordingly, since Trop, there is a presumption that the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment will change over time, “as society’s 
views on different criminal sanctions change.”55  Therefore, in interpreting 
the Eighth Amendment, the Court looks to see “what people actually 
think.”56  Thus, in determining society’s standards of decency, the Court 
employs a two-part inquiry.  First, the Court consults “the objective indicia” 
of relevant legislative enactments and sentencing juries to determine 
whether there is a national consensus against a sentence.57  Finally, the 
Court analyzes the penological justifications for the sentence and applies its 




49  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 41. 
50  U.S. Const. amend. VII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
51  Stephen Wormiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Defining the Contours of the Eighth 
Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/scotus-for-
law-students-defining-the-contours-of-the-eighth-amendment/ (explaining the important and divisive 
role Justices play in interpreting, and thus, determining what the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” 
means in today’s world). 
52  Id. 
53  Id.; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958). 
54  Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
55  Wormiel, supra note 51. 
56  See Dow, supra note 11. 
57  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012). 
58  Id. at 2466. 
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THE SUPREME COURT’S INCREMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND  
MINIMALISTIC BEHAVIOR 
 
“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our time.”59  
As mentioned above, judicial minimalism is prevalent in decisions where 
the justices engage in incremental decision-making.  Although the decision 
in Miller will be discussed more in depth below, this Note uses Miller as an 
example of judicial minimalism.  For example, in Miller, the Court 
expressly limited its ruling to only prohibiting the mandatory nature of the 
sentencing scheme involving juvenile offenders, and intentionally avoided 
the larger question of whether to prohibit sentencing all juvenile offenders 
to LWOP.60 
In analyzing jurisprudential philosophies, justices are usually defined 
as being one of four varieties: (1) majoritarians,61  (2) perfectionists,62  (3) 
minimalists,63 or (4) fundamentalists.64  At this time, the Court is comprised 
of mostly minimalists.65  “Minimalists are conservative in the literal 
sense.”66  They “prefer nudges to earthquakes.”67  With judicial minimalism, 
the justices prefer to take small steps, and attempt to do only what is 
“minimally” necessary to resolve the cases before them.68  Minimalists do 
not attempt to revolutionize the law by reference to first principles and thus, 
prefer to avoid radical revisions.69  Although minimalists may not always 
 
59  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
60  See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 1, 2005), https://newrepublic 
.com/article/64638/minimal-appeal (explaining that minimalists can either be liberal or conservative 
because “minimalism is a method and a constraint” rather than a program that produces particular 
results) [hereinafter Sunstein, Minimal Appeal]. 
61  Id. (noting that many of the great social programs of the New Deal era were legitimated as a 
result of majoritarianism). 
62  Id. (describing the Warren Court as perfectionists and explaining that in the last decade, 
perfectionists have sought to use the Constitution to strike down bans on same-sex marriage, to create a 
right to welfare, and to give people a right to make medical decisions free from governmental intrusion). 
63  Id. (describing Justices Breyer and Ginsburg as “Judicial Minimalists”); see also Mary 
Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led the Court’s “Kids 
Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489, 515 
(2013) (explaining that on the Roberts Court, all but two of the Court’s most conservative jurists have 
embraced judicial minimalism in one form or another). 
64  See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60 (describing Justice Thomas and former Justice 
Scalia as fundamentalists, who are committed to “originalism”). 
65  See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 515. 
66  See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60. 
67  Id. (describing Justices Frankfurter and Marshall Harlan as the great conservative voices on 
the Warren Court, and committed minimalists, who often criticized the Court’s tendency to “issue 
sweeping rules”); see also Berkheiser, supra note 63. 
68  See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60. 
69  See id. 
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agree with how previous judges have ruled, they nevertheless respect prior 
rulings “partly because respect promotes stability, and partly because 
respect makes it unnecessary for judges to fight over the most fundamental 
questions whenever a new problem arises.”70  Accordingly, minimalists 
prefer to decide cases rather than adopt theories.71 
It is often argued that the Supreme Court is a human institution that 
must adapt to the changing conditions shaped by American society and 
policy.72  The Court’s role is noteworthy because of the difficult role it 
assumes in American political life.73  This is primarily due to the 
controversial appointments of justices, the justices’ struggle for influence, 
the Court’s more bureaucratic structure, and the political controversies that 
are sparked by the important cases it decides.74  Generally speaking, the 
Court’s opinions serve as an institutional justification for collective 
decisions.  Today, however, the Court appears to be acting more like a 
political body, making political decisions, where its power in selecting its 
cases enables it to assume a “super legislature” role.75  When the Court is 
deciding major questions of public policy, it attempts to answer political 
controversies using the language, structure, and spirit of the Constitution.76  
The Court’s power lies in the persuasiveness of its rulings and rests with 
other political institutions, and public opinion.77  Therefore, because the 
Court is comprised of justices with sharp differences in approach, it has a 
tendency of behaving in a way that is likely due to its need to “muster the 
five votes,” as well as the difficulty in drawing lines.78 
Accordingly, the Court in Miller laid down a minimalistic and 
incremental decision.79  Although the majority expressed, and the dissenters 
acknowledged,80 the Court’s “kids are different” approach,81 the dissenters 
were nevertheless adamant about leaving this decision to the legislature and 
state practice.82  In response to the majority’s observation that discretionary 
LWOP sentences should be “uncommon,” Chief Justice Roberts interpreted 
 
70  Id. 
71  See id. 
72  DAVID M. OBRIEN, STORM CENTER 106 (Lisa C. McKay, 10th ed. 2014). 
73  Id. at 31. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 227. 
76  Id. at 259. 
77  Id. 
78  See Dow, supra note 11. 
79  Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 516. 
80  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477–78 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
81  See id. 
82  See id. 
08-ANDREA HUERTA 04.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/17  1:32 PM 
196 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:187 
 
this as the majority’s way of “bootstrap[ing] its way to declaring that the 
Eighth Amendment absolutely prohibits” LWOP sentences for juveniles.83  
Prior to this portion of the opinion, the majority appeared to be going down 
a path where the only logical conclusion was that it was going to 
categorically prohibit all LWOP sentences.84  Therefore, the dissenters 
argued, the majority’s opinion merely paved the way for “further judicial 
displacement of the legislative role in prescribing appropriate punishment 
for crime.”85 
In Miller, the Court could have—and should have—relied on the 
Eighth Amendment to explain how “cruel and unusual” it is for society to 
determine that a twelve-year-old boy or girl is so incorrigible or so “morally 
depraved” that they need to be locked up forever.86  There are likely only 
two presumptions that can potentially explain the Court’s approach.  First, 
the majority only addressed the issue before the Court and intentionally 
avoided the larger question in order to pave the way for the Court to address 
it in a future case.  In the alternative, considering the “need to muster the 
five votes,” the difficulty in “drawing lines,” or both, perhaps the majority 
only decided “what was necessary,” to find the mandatory nature of the 
LWOP sentence unconstitutional.87  Regardless, it is clear that these are just 
small steps that are likely the result of judicial minimalism.88  
Consequently, the Court in Miller is criticized for making “either a big 
mistake or a terrible blunder.”89 
Nevertheless one thing is clear: the decision in Miller indicates a sharp 
indication of how the American judicial system views juvenile offenders.90  
In fact, “[w]hat we are seeing is a very stark and important rethinking” of 
how juvenile offenders are treated.91  For example, as explained, prior to 
 
83  Id. at 2481 (using the word “unusual” as a synonym for “uncommon,” Chief Justice Roberts 
explains how eventually, the practice of LWOP will become so rare that the national consensus of 
LWOP will be practically non-existent and thus, the Court will be able to make LWOP unconstitutional 
in a later case in the future); see also id. at 2469 (majority opinion). 
84  See also id. at 2469 (majority opinion). 
85  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2481 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
86  See, e.g., Dow, supra note 11. 
87  See id. 
88  See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60. 
89  See Dow, supra note 11. 
90  Ethan Bronner, Sentencing Ruling Reflects Rethinking on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES (June 
26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/us/news-analysis-ruling-reflects-rethinking-on-juvenile-
justice.html?_r=0 (quoting Marsha Levick, co-founder of the nonprofit Juvenile Law Center in 
Philadelphia in 1975, “For years we were trying to convince the courts that kids have constitutional 
rights just like adults. Now we realize that to ensure kids are protected, we have to recognize that they 
are actually different from adults.”). 
91  See id. 
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Roper, all juvenile offenders faced the death penalty,92 and prior to 
Graham, nonhomicide juvenile offenders potentially faced LWOP 
sentences.93  Accordingly, in less than a decade, the Court has stepped away 
from (1) sentencing children to die,94 (2) sentencing nonhomicide juvenile 
offenders to LWOP,95 and (3) mandatorily sentencing children to LWOP.96  
However, the one thing that distinguishes the first two cases from the last is 
the Court’s approach.  For example, in Roper and Graham, the Court’s 
decisions were not minimalistic because in both, the Court categorically 
prohibited the sentences in their entirety.97 However, in Miller, the Court 
only prohibited the mandatory nature of the sentence.98 
This is not to say that judicial minimalism is never appropriate.  
Judicial minimalism may be an appropriate approach in some areas of the 
law.99  However, the juvenile justice system is not one of those areas.100  
Considering all that is known about how “kids are different,” and should 
accordingly be treated differently, the Court must drastically move towards 
preventing juveniles from being sentenced unfairly and 
disproportionately.101  In fact, considering the rate at which issues relating 
to juvenile sentencing arise, the Court must provide future sentencers with 
“a sense of what the law is,” or it will result in a significant burden on 
decisionmakers, future juvenile offenders, and their families.102  A look at 
the Court’s history indicates that in several occasions, it has recognized 
such issues in other cases.  For example, after decades of confusion 
regarding when a confession is considered voluntary, the Court decided the 
landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona.103  In Miranda, the Court presumed 
 
92  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005). 
93  See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010). 
94  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
95  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 48. 
96  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
97  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555; Graham, 560 U.S. at 48. 
98  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455. 
99  Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825 (2008) (describing how 
minimalism can be “a terrible blunder” in some areas, and explaining the areas where judicial 
minimalism may be appropriate, even though, in the end, they do not, “provide an adequate justification 
of minimalism”) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism]. 
100  See id. at 826 (explaining that minimalist rulings may only be appropriate when they 
decrease the costs of decisions and errors). 
101  See Bronner, supra note 90 (quoting Lisa M. Wayne, president of the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, “[n]ow all the research and the rulings support what we have known in our 
hearts to be true.”); see also Chang et al., infra note 172, at 95–101 (discussing disproportionate and 
extraordinary length sentences). 
102  See Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 99, at 836 (arguing that there is no 
adequate justification for judicial minimalism). 
103  See id. at 837 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) and using it as an 
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that all custodial interrogations created inherent coercion and required law 
enforcement to provide all suspects with a set of warnings before 
commencing custodial interrogations.104  In clarifying this area of the law, 
the Court understood the importance of providing further guidance due to 
the confusion and difficulty that resulted from the case-by-case analysis on 
the “voluntariness of confessions.”105 
The Court similarly employed this more expansive approach in Roper 
and Graham, where, among other things, the Court exercised its own 
independent judgment to reverse its position on the sentencing scheme at 
issue in both cases.106  For instance, in Roper, the Court noted that “the 
prosecutor argued Simmons’ youth was aggravating rather than mitigating, 
and although this sort of overreaching could be corrected by a particular 
rule to ensure that the mitigating force of youth is not overlooked”—such as 
the one laid down in Miller—it would nevertheless “not address the Court’s 
larger concerns.”107  Therefore, specifically in regards to the juvenile justice 
system, because the costs and errors of these minimalistic decisions are too 
high and too risky, the Court must engage in a more expansive approach to 
further clarify this area of the law.108 
 
THE MILLER DECISION 
 
In June 2012, the Supreme Court decided two companion cases, Miller 
v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, where two fourteen-year-old boys were 
convicted of murder and mandatorily sentenced to LWOP.109  The Court 
explained that in both cases, “[s]tate law mandated that each juvenile die in 
prison even if a judge or jury would have thought his youth and its 
attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser 
sentence more appropriate.”110  Thus, the Court concluded, mandatory 
sentencing schemes are unconstitutional when applied to LWOP for 
juveniles.111 
 
example of the importance of an expansive constitutional law interpretation); see also Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 478–79. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. 
106  See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 514 n.210; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 
(2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010). 
107  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
108  See Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 99, at 826 (minimalist rulings may 
only be appropriate when they decrease the costs of decisions and errors). 
109  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2012). 
110  Id. at 2460. 
111  Id. at 2463. 
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This conclusion was premised on two strands of precedent.112  The first 
strand focused on Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida.113  Together, 
these decisions adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on 
mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity 
of the penalty.114  The second strand was based on Woodson v. North 
Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio, which collectively required sentencing 
authorities to consider a defendant’s characteristics and the details of the 
offense before sentencing the defendant to death.115  Based on these cases, 
the Court in Miller concluded that children are entitled to an “individualized 
consideration” before being sentenced to LWOP.116  Accordingly, Miller 
reaffirmed the principle that “kids are different.”117 
Although the majority and the dissenters both acknowledged the “kids 
are different” principle, the evolving standards of decency inquiry caused a 
split amongst the Justices.118  Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito dissented, explaining that a national consensus existed 
because there was evidence of twenty-nine jurisdictions permitting 
mandatory LWOP for juveniles.119  The majority disagreed and emphasized 
its narrow decision, explaining that a national consensus was not needed 
because it was not banning LWOP in its entirety, but merely requiring a 
sentencer to follow a certain process before sentencing a juvenile to 
LWOP.120 
The majority reasoned that states authorizing LWOP sentences for 
juveniles do so through “two independent statutory provisions”—one 
allowing the transfer of juveniles to adult court, and the other setting 
penalties for those who are tried in adult court.121  Nevertheless, the 
majority explained, this process did not indicate that “the penalty ha[d] 
been endorsed through deliberate . . . legislative consideration.”122  
However, unpersuaded by the majority’s rationale, the dissenters 
 
112  Id. 
113  Id.; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
48 (2010). 
114  Id. 
115  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
116  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470. 
117  Id. at 2470. 
118  Id. at 2478 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 
119  Id. at 2477 (arguing that if 2,500 juveniles are serving LWOP, the sentence is not unusual). 
120  See id. at 2471 (majority opinion). 
121  Id. at 2472. 
122  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2472 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 
(2010)). 
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vehemently disagreed and criticized the majority for imposing its own 
values and displacing “the legislative role in proscribing appropriate 
punishment for crime.”123  The Court nevertheless stopped short of banning 
all juvenile LWOP sentences.124  Thus, Miller only requires judges to 
consider a juvenile’s age and attendant characteristics before irrevocably 
sentencing the juvenile to spend the rest of his or her life in prison.125 
As a result, the Miller decision merely purported to “help” about 
eighty percent of the 2,500 juvenile inmates serving mandatory LWOP 
sentences.126  However, this is more of a theory than a fact, because in 
Miller, the Court did not rule that LWOP is absolutely prohibited and 
therefore, unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders.127  Instead, it 
explained that sentencing juveniles to mandatory LWOP should be 
“uncommon.”128 The majority intentionally left open the possibility of there 
being some “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest 
possible penalty. . . .”129  Therefore, the Court stopped short of banning the 





WHERE MILLER WENT WRONG 
 
Although the decision in Miller signaled another step forward for the 
juvenile justice community, it was in effect, only a small step forward.131  In 
its decision, the Court took a “decided detour” around the Eighth 
Amendment “kids are different” jurisprudence.132  Most importantly, it 
departed from the precedent on which it passionately relied on.133  For 
instance, although it relied on Roper and Graham in its legal analysis, the 
decision veered far away from the conclusion of those decisions.134  
Specifically, Miller did not impose a broad categorical rule prohibiting 
 
123  Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting); see also Dow, supra note 11. 
124  See Tanehaus, supra note 18. 
125  See id. 
126  See Dow, supra note 11. 
127  Id. 
128  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
129  Id. 
130  Id. at 2463. 
131  See Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 60. 
132  See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 507. 
133  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455. 
134  See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 501. 
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LWOP sentences on all juvenile offenders, which is a result both Roper and 
Graham reached.135  A categorical ban on all LWOP sentences on juvenile 
offenders would have drawn a clear line, which is necessary to ensure these 
“cruel and unusual” punishments are not imposed on juvenile offenders.136  
However, the Court in Miller distinguished its decision from the one it 
made in Graham by relying on the fact that Graham imposed a “flat ban” 
on LWOP sentences applicable to only nonhomicide crimes.137  Although 
the decision in Graham only related to nonhomicide offenses, Miller was 
not similarly constrained because both of the petitioners had requested the 
Court to consider prohibiting LWOP sentences for all juvenile offenders.138  
There is no reason, nor does the Court attempt to provide for one, as to why 
juveniles who commit murder are more culpable, and thus, distinguishable 
from those who do not.139 
Moreover, a central problem in Miller is that it requires lower courts to 
employ a case-by-case, individualized sentencing scheme, which is an 
approach the Court expressly rejected in both Roper and Graham.140  In 
Roper, the Court originally considered individualized sentencing, 
acknowledging that it was a central feature in death penalty sentencing 
cases.141  However, in rejecting this approach, the Court announced the 
“kids are different” principle and emphasized the potential risks that exist 
when the “brutality or cold-blooded nature of [a] particular crime 
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course.”142  
As a result, the Court explained, “in some cases, a defendant’s youth may 
even be counted against him.”143  The Court also found it compelling how 
 
135  See Brian J. Fuller, Case Note, A Small Step Forward in Juvenile Sentencing, But Is It 
Enough? The United States Supreme Court Ends Mandatory Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences; 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 13 WYO. L. REV. 377, 382–84 (2013) (explaining had the 
Court employed the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, it would have relied on the objective 
indicia of societal consensus and its own independent moral judgment to establish a categorical ban on 
the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences). 
136  See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 501; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005); 
Graham v. Florida, 450 U.S. 48 (2010). 
137  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012); see also Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 
501. 
138  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; see also Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 501. 
139  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (finding sufficient its holding that mandatory LWOP sentences 
for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment, thus it did not need to “consider Jackson’s and 
Miller’s alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on [LWOP] for 
juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.”). 
140  See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 502. 
141  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) (explaining this “system is designed to 
consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including youth, in every case.”). 
142  Id. at 572–73. 
143  See id. at 573 (noting “the prosecutor argued Simmons’ youth was aggravating rather than 
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even expert psychologists find it difficult and refrain from attempting to 
differentiate between juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect a capacity for 
change, from those whose crimes reflect “irreparable corruption.”144  The 
Court thus concluded that states must similarly “refrain from asking jurors 
to issue a far graver condemnation—that a juvenile merits the death 
penalty.”145 Accordingly, to ensure that no juvenile offender would be 
sentenced to death again, the Court adopted a rule, whereby all juvenile 
offenders were placed off limits.146 
Additionally, in Graham, the Court battled with confining the 
boundaries147 of the LWOP sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders, 
which required “a case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry.”148 In 
rejecting this case-specific disproportionality inquiry, the Court noted the 
potential risk of inaccuracy associated with attempting to distinguish 
between juvenile offenders who are incorrigible and those who have the 
capacity for change.149 Furthermore, this approach fails to consider the 
difficulties associated with representing juvenile offenders.150 Thus, the 
Court focused on protecting nonhomicide, juvenile offenders from being 
erroneously sentenced to LWOP because of the risk of a judge or jury 
finding the juvenile sufficiently culpable to deserve a LWOP sentence.151  
Thus, based on all that we know about how “kids are different,” the Court 
in Roper and Graham rejected individualized sentencing schemes because 
of the risks that gory facts of a heinous crime committed by a juvenile 
offender would pose in a judge or jury’s sentencing determination.152  
 
mitigating,” and although “this sort of overreaching could be corrected by a particular rule to ensure that 
the mitigating force of youth is not overlooked, [it] would not address [the Court’s] larger concerns.”). 
144  Id. (explaining the rule prohibiting psychiatrists from diagnosing patients under the age of 
eighteen with antisocial personality disorders). 
145  Id. (prohibiting states from ending a juvenile’s life and potential to attain a mature 
understanding of his own maturity). 
146  See id. at 574; see also Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 504. 
147  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010) (explaining how difficult sentencing is for trial 
judges, because they must take into account “the human existence of the offender and the just demands 
of a wronged society”). 
148  Id. (the case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry requires that the sentencer consider the 
offender’s age and weigh it against the seriousness of the crime). 
149  Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). 
150  Id. at 78 (explaining how juveniles mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the 
criminal justice system, as well as the roles of the institutional actors within it); see also YOUTH ON 
TRIAL, supra note 23. 
151  Id. at 79. 
152  Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 510; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (explaining how the defendant’s 
youth was used as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 
(2010) (explaining how the sentencing judge found the defendant “irredeemably depraved,” and 
“incorrigible”). 
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Notwithstanding this, Miller neglected all the potential risks associated with 
such a sentencing scheme and “inject[ed] it into the very heart of 
sentencing.”153 
Although the “lynchpin of the Graham logic” was based on the 
juvenile’s “diminished culpability” and “heightened capacity for change,” 
the Court in Miller disregarded the penological justifications that it had 
relied on in Graham.154  Although “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not 
mandate adoption of any one penological theory,” it is not dispositive in 
establishing whether a sentence is justified.155  Thus, a sentence lacking any 
legitimate penological justification, is in effect, disproportionate to the 
offense.156  In fact, the Court in Graham explained that LWOP is “the 
second most severe penalty permitted by law.”157  In explaining the severity 
of a LWOP sentence, the Court in Graham compared LWOP to a death 
sentence, noting that LWOP: “[M]eans denial of hope; it means that good 
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever 
the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will 
remain in prison for the rest of his days.”158 
In Miller, the Court was correct in considering the penological 
justifications before concluding that none of the penological goals were 
served by the mandatory sentencing schemes.159  Namely, deterrence plays 
no role in the decision-making process of juvenile offenders because they 
make impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions, which indicates 
they are less likely to take possible punishment into consideration when 
making such decisions.160  Additionally, although incapacitation is an 
important goal because of the risk that an offender’s potential recidivism 
might pose to society, justifying LWOP for a juvenile requires “making a 
judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.”161  Notably, this runs contrary to 
the notion that juveniles have “greater prospects of reform.”162  Finally, 
 
153  See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 513. 
154  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
155  See id. at 71 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) and noting that the 
Court has recognized four penological sanctions as legitimate: (1) retribution, (2) deterrence, (3) 
incapacitation, and (4) rehabilitation). 
156  See id. 
157  See id. at 69–70 (noting that LWOP is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile offender 
to serve because he or she will serve more years in prison than an adult offender). 
158  See id. at 70 (citing Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526 (1989)). 
159  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465–66 (2012). 
160  See id.; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (Juveniles offenders “have a lack 
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”). 
161  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72). 
162  See supra text accompanying note 5 (“Capacity for change” is one of the three fundamental 
characteristics that make children constitutionally different from adults.). 
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rehabilitation is a penological goal that forms the basis of parole systems.163  
Accordingly, as the Court in Miller acknowledged, LWOP “cannot be 
justified by the goal of rehabilitation,”164 because this penalty “forswears 
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”165 
Most defendants serving LWOP rarely receive access to the 
rehabilitative services that are available to other inmates.166  Juvenile 
offenders need and are most receptive to such rehabilitation.  The absence 
of such rehabilitative services or treatments results in an extremely 
disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders.167  However, despite 
the Court’s understanding and awareness of the lack of justifications that 
make LWOP sentences inadequate for juvenile offenders, it surprisingly 
still believes there would be “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles 
to [LWOP].”168 This narrow decision in Miller failed to offer any reason or 
explanation for its limited ruling, which in turn, has left many questions 
unanswered. The resulting effect of this decision is discussed in the 
following section. 
 
MILLER’S EFFECT ON THE FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE  
SYSTEM 
 
Those who sought resentencing under Miller faced a “head-on 
collision with everything Roper and Graham warned against.”169 Although 
Miller provided all juvenile offenders with the opportunity to seek a lesser 
sentence, it failed to ensure that this new sentencing determination was the 
product of sound and principled decision-making.170 For example, because 
Miller only required sentencers to consider the fact that children are 
different, and how these differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing 
them to LWOP, it failed to provide any guidelines for sentencing such 
juvenile offenders.171 Accordingly, it left many questions unanswered. First, 
will it apply retroactively?172 Second, will it apply to discretionary 
 
163  Graham, 560 U.S. at 73. 
164  Id. at 74. 
165  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
166  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
167  Id. 
168  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
169  See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 507. 
170  See id. at 514. 
171  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
172  See Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 86 (2015). 
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sentencing schemes or extraordinary length sentences?173 Lastly, what, if 
anything, does Miller require when courts sentence juvenile offenders on a 
case-by-case basis?174 As a result, states were left responding to these 
situations differently, using a variety of approaches, which in turn, has 
resulted in many different conclusions.175 The most concerning of these 
approaches relates to those states that “have found ways to circumvent” the 
individualized sentencing scheme required by Miller.176 
First, Miller never addressed the question177 of resentencing inmates 
who had already been mandatorily sentenced to LWOP for crimes 
committed when they were children.178  Accordingly, this question—of 
retroactivity—resulted in state courts responding differently.179  While some 
of the states that found Miller retroactive provided juvenile offenders with 
an opportunity to be resentenced, other states did not.180 Consequently, 
similar offenders, in similar positions, have been treated and subsequently 
sentenced very differently.181 
A retroactivity analysis usually follows the framework provided for in 
Teague v. Lane, which provided distinctions for determining a “new rule” 
versus an “old rule,” and “between decisions based on ‘substantive’ law 
rather than procedure.”182 Most courts addressing this issue found that 
Miller announced a new rule, however, they reached different conclusions 
on whether it was a substantive rule or if it constituted a watershed rule of 
criminal procedure.183  For instance, courts in Florida, Michigan, and 
 
173  Id. at 87. 
174  Id. at 92. 
175  See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016) (comparing the cases that have 
reached different conclusions on whether the holding in Miller was retroactive). 
176  Chang et al., supra note 172, at 87–88. 
177  Although the Supreme Court subsequently found the holding in Miller is retroactive, this 
portion of the analysis is limited to only discussing the issues that arose after Miller.  See Montgomery 
v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).  A more thorough analysis of the retroactivity issue is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
178  See The Sentencing Project, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate 
on Life Without Parole 3 (2014), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_ 
Miller.pdf [hereinafter The Sentencing Project]. 
179  See id.; see also Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: A New Look–Maybe–at Life Sentences 
for Youths, SCOTUSBLOG, www.sctousblog.com/2015/10/a-new-look-maybe-at-life-sentences-for-
youths (explaining the complexity of the decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). 
180  See The Sentencing Project, supra note 178. 
181  See id. 
182  See Chang et al., supra note 172, at 92; see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 289. 
183  See Chang et al., supra note 172, at 92; see also Denniston, supra note 179 (explaining how 
Teague Doctrine requires a new rule apply retroactively in two circumstances: “first, if it is a substantive 
rule limiting the kind of conduct that can be treated as criminal or limiting a kind of punishment that can 
be imposed; or, second, if it is a procedural rule that goes to the basic fairness of a criminal trial.”). 
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Minnesota interpreted Miller as a procedural rule, finding that Miller was 
“not retroactively applicable to cases pending on collateral review.”184 On 
the other hand, state courts in Mississippi, Massachusetts, Illinois, Iowa, 
and Louisiana, found that Miller announced a substantive rule, which did 
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.185 Nevertheless, despite the 
Court’s ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana, states still retain the authority 
to decide whether to provide retroactive relief under their respective 
retroactivity doctrines.186 
Additionally, although recent studies suggest a “robust consensus” 
against the use of juvenile LWOP,187 and boast about the “speed and 
consistency” in which states have responded to Miller, these conclusions 
are misleading.188 The fact that states factually or statistically appear to be 
rejecting the idea of juvenile LWOP is not dispositive. These states may not 
be sentencing juveniles to LWOP, but instead, are in-effect imposing 
sentences that are the functional equivalent of a LWOP.189 For example, it 
has been reported that since Miller, fourteen of the twenty-eight states that 
had mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences before Miller, have enacted laws 
“in compliance” with federal law.190  These laws may appear beneficial to 
juvenile offenders because they restrict the imposition of a maximum 
number of years that the juvenile may be sentenced.  However, they also 
provide the minimum term that a juvenile may be sentenced, which 
generally range from fifteen years to forty years.191 
These issues are specifically prevalent in the context of whether Miller 
was limited solely to mandatory sentences or if it also included 
discretionary or extraordinary length sentences. This issue can be 
especially attributed to the majority’s decision in Miller to conclude with 
 
184  Cara H. Drinan, Commentary: Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 786, 
791 (2014) (discussing the many ways in which state actors have failed to comply with the Court’s 
mandate). 
185  Id. 
186  See Juvenile Life Without Parole After Miller v. Alabama, A Report of the Phillips Black 
Project, at 2 (July 2015). 
187  Cf. Brief of The Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & the Justice & the Criminal 
Justice Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. 
Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14–280) (arguing a national consensus exists against the use of LWOP because 
most states have abandoned the practice of sentencing juveniles to LWOP in law or practice). 
188  Id. at 6 (comparing the rate that states have “responded” to Miller to explain that it has been 
much faster than that of other decisions involving juveniles by relying on that fact that in the three years 
since Miller, an average of three states per year have repudiated juvenile LWOP). 
189  Chang et al., supra note 172, at 100. 
190  But cf. Miller v. Alabama and Juvenile Life Without Parole Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/miller-v-
alabama-and-juvenile-life-without-parole-laws.aspx. 
191  See id. 
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there being “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest 
possible penalty. . . .”192 As the Chief Justice noted, this “disclaimer” was 
entirely unnecessary to the rule that the majority announced.193 
Nevertheless, because of this “decided departure,” many states have 
interpreted Miller narrowly and thus, have limited it to only prohibiting 
mandatory LWOP sentences.  In effect, these states do not interpret Miller 
as a prohibition on discretionary or extraordinary length sentences.  What 
these states fail to acknowledge is that although Miller’s conclusion was 
ambiguous, the Supreme Court has nevertheless unambiguously expressed 
the “kids are different” principle in various cases over the past decade.  
Practically speaking, these states are using the decision in Miller to 
inadvertently violate a precedential constitutional principle.  Discretionary 
sentences usually provide the sentencer with the option of imposing a 
variety of sentences,194 and extraordinary length sentences are exactly what 
the name suggests; sentences consisting of an unusually extended length of 
time.195 
Courts struggling with this issue argue that Miller’s language is 
explicitly directed solely towards mandatory LWOP sentences, and thus, 
does not apply to discretionary or extraordinary length sentences.196  At 
least seven of these states that do not consider Miller binding on them 
interpret Miller’s holding as only prohibiting mandatory sentences.197 These 
states argue that because they provide nonmandatory, or discretionary 
sentencing schemes, they are not violating the mandate in Miller because 
Miller only prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders.198  
Thus, a court in these states can still impose a LWOP sentence on a juvenile 
offender so long as there is nothing “requiring” it to do so. 
As to the states imposing “extraordinary length” sentences, these states 
also interpret the holding in Miller narrowly, by finding that Miller only 
prohibited mandatory life without parole sentences.199  These states argue 
that because they will provide juvenile offenders with parole at a later date, 
they are not actually prohibiting parole.200  The caveat lies within the 
temporal limitation, which in effect, offers parole at a date so far in the 
 
192  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
193  Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
194  Chang et al., supra note 172, at 95–98. 
195  Id. at 99–101. 
196  Id. at 95, 98–99. 
197  Id. at 98 (including Virginia, Georgia, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin). 
198  See id. at 95–98. 
199  See id. at 99–101. 
200  See id. at 100. 
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future that it will likely exceed the juvenile’s natural life expectancy.201  For 
example, in Florida, the longest sentence recorded was a ninety-nine-year 
single sentence.202  These sentences are essentially imposing the same 
punishment the juvenile would have received had he been sentenced to 
LWOP.  Thus, the juvenile is facing the “functional equivalent” of LWOP, 
without the mandated individualized consideration Miller imposes.203  
These sentences deprive the child of the “most basic liberties without 
[being] given hope of restoration,” which is constitutionally repugnant 
because the Eighth Amendment “forbids States [sic] from making the 
judgment at the outset that those offenders [will ever] be fit to reenter 
society.”204 
Lastly, and perhaps the biggest question moving forward is: what does 
Miller require from a sentencer when sentencing a juvenile offender?  
While not an exhaustive list, the Court in Miller did offer some sort of 
guidance on what sentencing judges should identify when sentencing a 
juvenile offender.205  The sentencing judge should consider several factors 
relating to specific characteristics surrounding the child and the crime, such 
as: (1) the character and record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the offense; (2) the child’s background, as well as mental 
and emotional development, (3) the child’s age and hallmark features; (4) 
the child’s family and home environment, especially where it will help the 
sentencer understand why the child was surrounded by such a harmful 
environment; (5) the child’s participation in the offense, especially with an 
eye towards whether peer pressure was involved; (6) whether any lesser 
included offenses could have been included; and (7) the child’s ability to be 
rehabilitated.206 
Nevertheless, although it appears that Miller left the lower courts with 
some factors to consider, these factors do not address whether they should 
be considered exclusively, whether they are not mutually exclusive, or 
instead, whether the lower courts may consider only those factors it deems 
appropriate.  As to the latter, this increases the risk that a sentencer will 
 
201  See id. 
202  See Maggie Lee, Florida Struggles with Youth Life Sentences, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (July 
30, 2012), http://jjie.org/florida-struggles-youth-life-sentences/90589/ (explaining Florida’s battle with 
extraordinary length sentences after Graham). 
203  Chang et al., supra note 172, at 100 (as stated above, this Note takes the position that the 
individualized consideration mandated by Miller contradicts the principles established in Roper and 
Graham, but nevertheless concede to it in this respect, in order to establish that Miller left lower courts 
with no direction, which is another problem with the decision in Miller). 
204  Id. at 101. 
205  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69 (2012). 
206  See id. at 2467–68; see also Chang et al., supra note 172, at 90–91. 
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subjectively choose which factors to consider while emphasizing the factors 
that appeal the most to him or her.  This is precisely a risk the Court 
expressly warned against in Roper and Graham, when it rejected such 
individualized sentencing schemes.  Therefore, without further guidance, 
the lower courts will essentially be able to continue behaving in a manner 
that ignores the constitutional principle that “kids are different.”  In fact, 
now judges have a list of factors that they can use to justify their decisions 
in sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP. 
 
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM THROUGH A COMPARATIVE LAW   
PERSPECTIVE 
 
The concerns stated above are further exacerbated by evidence of the 
juvenile justice system through a comparative law perspective.  A close 
look at the Court’s precedent shows that it has generally given some 
consideration to international standards as part of the Eighth Amendment’s 
decency calculus in cases involving juveniles.207  For reasons not explained, 
however, the Court in Miller did not partake in any comparative analysis.208  
The Court in Miller disregarded the fact that “the international community 
speaks with one clear, disapproving voice” towards the way our country 
treats juvenile offenders.209  Nevertheless, before delving into why the 
comparative law perspective is so important in cases involving juveniles, it 
may be helpful to begin by first explaining why a comparative 
constitutional law analysis is appropriate and legitimate in the first place. 
Constitutional meaning derives from the practice of argument and 
appeal made with proper forms, which appeal to the text, history, doctrine, 
prudence, structure, and ethos of the Constitution of the United States.210  
Thus, judicial review is legitimated by our adherence to these six different 
approaches.211  First and foremost, a comparative constitutional analysis has 
influenced legal reasoning and judicial decision-making since the birth of 
the United States.212  Over the past seventy-five years, the Court has 
 
207  See Craig, supra note 32, at 397–98; see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
208  See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
209  See Craig, supra note 32, at 397.  For a further explanation on the history of the Supreme 
Court’s behavior in interpreting foreign sources of law see for example Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie 
Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and 
the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 856–57, 859, 864 (Dec. 2005) 
[hereinafter Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Law]. 
210  Bradley Silverman, The Legitimacy of Comparative Constitutional Law: A Modal 
Evaluation, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 307, 309 (2016). 
211  Id. at 309–10. 
212  Id. at 310. 
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referenced foreign law213 in an increasingly significant number of 
constitutional cases.214  Therefore, the Court’s precedent implies that it is 
appropriate to refer to foreign law in constitutional cases. 
Similarly, it is not dispositive that the application of foreign law is not 
expressly discussed in the Constitution.  Instead, the fact that the 
Constitution is silent on applying foreign law suggests that although it does 
not condone the practice, it does not condemn it either.215  As former Chief 
Justice Marshall once explained, decisions of other countries exhibit how 
the law of nations is understood elsewhere, and how it will be considered in 
determining the rule, which is to prevail here.216  Those decisions, he 
clarified, while not binding authority on United States Courts, merit 
respectful attention for their potential persuasive value.217  Consequently, 
foreign law serves as a tool that can help the Court understand and interpret 
what is, fundamentally, American law.218  For example, just as we regularly 
employ a number of various other sources, such as law review articles, 
books, other laws, canons of construction, legislative history, and common 
law terms of art, we should apply foreign law similarly.219 
In determining the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, “the climate of 
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular 
punishment is also not irrelevant.”220  In fact, “[t]o decide any case, a judge 
needs to know certain things about the world; statutes and case law cannot 
be used to resolve legal disputes, unless on their own, they are applied to 
the facts at hand.”221  Accordingly, “foreign decisions may contain truths, 
knowledge, or information about facts of the world that are relevant to an 
American Judge.”222  As Justice Ginsburg has instructed, judges should 
make an effort to learn what they can from the experience and wisdom that 
 
213  See Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Law, supra note 209, at 748 n.5 (“Foreign law 
is considered to include statutes and cases of other countries arrived at after American independence in 
1776.  We think the term includes the writing of foreign jurists and scholars.”). 
214  See id. at 838–39. 
215  See Silverman, supra note 210, at 319.  
216  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speech at the American University International Academy of 
Comparative Law (Jul. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Justice Ginsburg, Speech]; see also Calabresi, The 
Supreme Court & Foreign Law, supra note 209, at 763–80 (discussing former Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s “lengthy tenure” on the United States Supreme Court, where he wrote several important 
opinions that referred to foreign law). 
217  Justice Ginsburg, Speech, supra note 216 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s perspective on 
the impact international law has on U.S. law). 
218  See Silverman, supra note 210, at 344. 
219  Id. at 310. 
220  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010). 
221  See Silverman, supra note 210, at 334. 
222  Id. 
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foreign sources may convey because they are helpful in what they should 
do—and more importantly, they are helpful in what they should not do.223  
Notably, relying on foreign law creates healthy relationships around the 
world, which builds trust and cooperation between nations to combat 
mutual enemies, and find solutions to the new legal problems of today that 
practitioners can all learn and benefit from tomorrow.224 
Additionally, applying foreign law is further supported in proportion to 
how recently it has found expression in the case law.”225  For example, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has recently invoked foreign or 
international legal sources to aid it in resolving constitutional questions in a 
number of recent cases, which represents doctrinal support for citing 
foreign law as persuasive authority.226  This idea focuses on the 
“consistency, harmonization, and integrity of treating like cases alike.”227  
Harmonizing our law with that of other nations allows us to achieve 
transnational consistency because “we are bound into a global community, 
especially on questions of fundamental rights.”228 
However, historical evidence suggests that the application of foreign 
law should be limited to cases where the justices must determine whether a 
certain practice is reasonable, as it does in the Fourth Amendment context, 
or whether it is unusual, as it does in the Eighth Amendment context.229  
Specifically, “[w]here the text [of the Constitution] takes the form of 
determinate rules, an interpreter’s discretion is fixed; but where it uses 
vague standards or abstract principles, we must apply them to our own 
circumstances in our own time.”230  For instance, in Roper, the majority 
opinion and Justice O’Connor’s dissent both cited foreign law, despite their 
disagreement on the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty.231  In 
Roper, the Court compared the number of countries that had executed 
juvenile offenders within the preceding fifteen years to demonstrate the 
existence of a virtually universal global repulsion toward executing 
children.232  In comparing the evolution of the practice in the international 
community, the Court explained that referring to the laws of other countries 
 
223  See Justice Ginsburg, Speech, supra note 216. 
224  Id. 
225  See Silverman supra note 210, at 327. 
226  Id. at 328. 
227  Id. 
228  Id. at 16. 
229  See Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Sources of Law, supra note 209, at 755–56. 
230  Silverman, supra note 210, at 318. 
231 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–79 (2005); see also id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
232  See id. at 575–78 (majority opinion). 
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and international authorities is instructive in interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”233  As a 
result, Roper serves as just one example of how the Court has consistently 
relied on foreign law; specifically, in cases involving the Eighth 
Amendment, which require an analysis into the objective indicia.234 
Accordingly, interpreting a textually indeterminate constitutional 
provision, such as the Eighth Amendment, in light of contemporary 
conditions, requires looking to external sources.235  Therefore, relying on 
foreign law is especially appropriate in cases involving cruel and unusual 
punishment, where the Court is asked to make determinations of 
reasonableness.236  Moreover, because “comparative analysis is 
emphatically relevant to the task of . . . enforcing human rights,” applying 
foreign law is particularly important in these Eighth Amendment cases.237  
Therefore, applying foreign law to cases involving cruel and unusual 
punishment reiterates the following two important principles: (1) that our 
Constitution is a living document, meant to endure for the ages;238 and (2) 
the formulation expressed in Trop v. Dulles.239  Notably, the plurality 
opinion in Trop was not only important because it provided the benchmark 
for the Court in understanding the phrase “cruel and unusual 
punishment,”240  but it is also important because it serves as the beginning 
of the modern Court’s reliance on foreign law in its Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 241  Thus, in Eighth Amendment cases, the Court frequently 
looks to foreign law to determine the evolving standards of decency in 
evaluating what punishments are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.242 
Therefore, because an international perspective is appropriate and 
legitimate in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, this Note will continue by 
 
233  Id. 
234  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2487 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting how the 
Court occasionally relied on foreign law in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988); and Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977)). 
235  See id. 
236  See Steven Calabresi, A Shining City on a Hill: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme 
Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1413 (2006). 
237  See Thomas E. Baker, A Modest Experiment in Pedagogy: Lessons on Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 6 FIU L. REV. 99, 108 (2010–11). 
238  See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
239  See Wormiel, supra note 51 (explaining how the meaning of the Eighth Amendment would 
change over time as society’s views on different criminal sanctions changed); see also Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
240  See id. 
241  See id. 
242  See id. 
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explaining its importance in relation to Miller v. Alabama and specifically, 
as it relates to the issues surrounding the juvenile justice system.  As 
mentioned above, over the last seventy-five years, a significant number of 
cases have relied on foreign law in criminal cases.243  In fact, most Eighth 
Amendment cases decided during the last seventy-five years have, at the 
minimum, at least impliedly or expressly mentioned foreign law.244  
However, the Court in Miller did not; instead, it ignored the fact that the 
United States is currently the only country in the world that is responsible 
for 100% of all the children currently being sentenced to die in prison as a 
result of their LWOP sentences.245 
Moreover, the international community has impliedly confirmed the 
Court’s own principle that “kids are different,” where most states246 have 
either never allowed, expressly prohibited, or avoided sentencing juvenile 
offenders to LWOP.247  In fact, international law recognizes that sentencing 
children to LWOP contravenes society’s notion of fairness and emphasizes 
the “shared legal responsibility” that society has in protecting and 
promoting child development.248  Hence, there is a clear international 
consensus against sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP.249 
In addition to this international consensus, there are human rights 
treaties that prohibit LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders in which the 
United States is a party.250  Treaties are relevant to the Eighth Amendment 
analysis because the United States is a party to several of these treaties.251  
As a party to a treaty, the United States assumes the responsibility of 
complying with such international obligations.252  Moreover, under the 
United States Constitution, the United States must uphold these legal 
 
243  See Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Sources of Law, supra note 209, at 846 (noting 
there is “scarcely a prominent Eighth Amendment case decided during the last sixty-five years that does 
not at least mention foreign legal opinion and practice”). 
244  See id. 
245  Connie De La Vega & Michelle Leighton, Article: Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: 
Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 989 (2008). 
246  This Note follows the international practice of referring to the nations around the world as 
“states,” which is commonly done in the international realm. 
247  De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 245, at 989 (explaining that as of 2008, there were at 
least 135 states that expressly rejected the sentence via their domestic legal commitments, and 185 
countries that have done so in the U.N. General Assembly). 
248  Id. at 1008–09. 
249  See Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International, et al., in Support of Petitions at *6, Miller 
v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647). 
250  See id. at *6. 
251  See id. at *28. 
252  See id. 
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obligations.253  Specifically, there are two relevant treaties that relate to 
juvenile sentencing practice.  First, is the Committee on Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”), which forbids sentencing juveniles to LWOP.  Second, is the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which 
reflects language similar to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.254 
The CRC requires states to prohibit sentencing juvenile offenders to 
the death penalty and LWOP.255  The United States is the only country in 
the world that has failed to ratify the CRC.256 Additionally, the ICCPR 
prohibits “cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment.”257  It 
also requires prisons to focus on reforming and socially rehabilitating 
prisoners, as well as segregating juvenile offenders from adult offenders so 
that treatment can be provided according to the offender’s age and legal 
status.258 
However, the United State has failed to comply with the ICCPR since 
its ratification.  In fact, fourteen years after the U.S. ratified the ICCPR, the 
Committee on Human Rights determined the U.S. had failed to comply with 
the treaty, despite its reservation, where the U.S. reserved its right to try 
juvenile offenders in adult court only in “exceptional circumstances.”259  
The ICCPR determined that the U.S. was abusing its reservation in applying 
LWOP sentences only in “exceptional circumstances.”260  The ICCPR 
concluded that the U.S. was not limiting LWOP sentences to “exceptional 
circumstances.”261  Instead, the ICCPR found that a significant number of 
U.S. children—many of whom were first-time offenders—had been tried as 
adults.262 
This is just one example of how the United States continues to 
disregard international norms and rules, some of which it has formally 
agreed to follow, and subsequently violated.  It is clear that the U.S. is not 
in compliance with its international obligations.  Specifically, the fact that 
the U.S. is the only country in the world that still permits sentencing 
 
253  See id. 
254  De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 245, at 1009. 
255  Id. 
256  See id. 
257  ICCPR art. 7. 
258  ICCPR art. 10(3). 
259  De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 245, at 1010–11 n.145.  In its ratification of the ICCPR, 
the United States declared, “The United States reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat 
juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of article 10 and paragraph 4 of article 14.” 
260  Id. at 1010–11. 
261  See id. 
262  Id. 
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children to LWOP, indicates an international consensus against this 
practice.  Consequently, the U.S. must make significant changes to ensure 
that juvenile offenders are proportionately sentenced so that it is in 
compliance with its international obligations, and in turn, effectively begin 
to display the “kids are different” principle that the Supreme Court has 
emphatically advocated for within the past decade. 
 
ALTERNATIVES: A CUMULATIVE EFFORT 
 
Despite all that has been said as to “where Miller went wrong,” it is 
nevertheless a decision handed down by the United States Supreme Court.  
Moreover, it was premised on the “kids are different” principle.  In 
addition, it is currently the only guiding decision on LWOP sentences for 
juvenile homicide offenders.  It is also helpful as a starting point for a 
cumulative effort for juvenile justice reform.  This cumulative effort 
requires the cooperation of all those involved with juvenile offenders.  For 
example, state actors should do their best to give “meaningful effect to the 
substantive principles animated in the Court’s prior decisions.”263  After 
Miller, state governments should have attempted to take “proactive” 
measures.264  Ideally, state legislatures should have filled the gaps where 
outdated legislation prevented judges from acting.265  Moreover, state courts 
should have re-analyzed previously sentenced juvenile offenders, as well as 
juvenile sentencing in its entirety.266  Notwithstanding the ambiguities that 
resonated from the decision in Miller, one thing is clear: because “children 
are categorically different in the eyes of the law at sentencing . . . 
prosecutorial practices should reflect that interpretation of the 
Constitution.”267  However, it appears that this principle has “fallen on deaf 
ears.”268 
If our juvenile justice system is to experience any real, positive 
change, there must be a cumulative effort on behalf of all three branches of 
government.  To begin, our state lawmakers must accept their responsibility 
in taking the first step.269  For instance, mandatory LWOP is a statutory-
based penalty.270  Accordingly, in Miller, the Court considered the objective 
 
263  See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 184, at 788. 
264  See id. 
265  Id. 
266  Id. 
267  Id. 
268  Id. at 785. 
269  See id. at 786. 
270  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 n.10 (2012). 
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indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and 
state practice to determine whether there was a national consensus against 
LWOP.271  As a result, the legislature’s actions and states’ practices were a 
direct result of why the Court decided the way it did.  However, as 
previously mentioned, although prohibiting or removing mandatory LWOP 
sentences is a step in the right direction, when these sentences are replaced 
with discretionary or extraordinary length sentences, the state is in-effect 
contravening “the spirit of Miller.”272  Therefore, in order to “embrace the 
Supreme Court’s vision” of treating juvenile offenders differently because 
of their capacity for change, state lawmakers must consider alternatives to 
help juvenile inmates in the long run.273 
States should begin by re-focusing the juvenile justice system to reflect 
its originally intended purpose: to be an alternative system to the adult 
criminal system, which focuses on individualized rehabilitation and 
treatment, civil jurisdiction, informal procedure, and separate 
incapacitation.274  A good example of this is exhibited in the innovative 
policies and programs recently implemented by the state legislatures in 
Maine, Maryland, and New Jersey.275  Specifically, in 2015, the Maine 
Supreme Court modified the Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure to 
prohibit using restraints on juveniles in the courtrooms.276  Additionally, 
Maryland and New Jersey passed stricter laws to lessen the number of 
juveniles being charged as adults.277  State lawmakers should also ensure 
that prisons provide these juvenile inmates with opportunities to 
demonstrate their capacity for change.278  This can be accomplished by 
providing juvenile inmates with classes relating to “substance abuse and 
alcohol education and treatment, as well as employment and skills 
training.”279 
Additionally, state court judges, who play a more active role in 
sentencing, can make a significant difference in the juvenile justice system 
 
271  See id. at 2480. 
272  See Drinan, supra note 184, at 793. 
273  See id. 
274  Tanehaus, supra note 18 (explaining the principles that the first juvenile justice system in the 
U.S. was founded upon). 
275  See NCSL Juvenile Justice Quarterly Newsletter, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/ncsl-juvenile-justice-quarterly-newsletter 
635876058.aspx. 
276  See id. 
277  See id.; cf. H.R. 618, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015) (ending the practice of 
automatically holding juveniles, who are being charged as adults, in adult criminal court), and S.J. Res. 
2003, 216th Leg., (N.J. 2003) (increasing the minimum age that a youth can be tried as an adult). 
278  See Drinan, supra note 184, at 793. 
279  See id. 
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as well.280  As noted in the cases discussed thus far, sentencing judges often 
have one of the closest interactions with the inmate and the case.  This 
makes them more capable of ensuring first-hand that juvenile offenders 
receive a fair process.281  These judges have the power of deciding whether 
to implement the individualized sentencing approach mandated by Miller 
by interpreting their state constitutional provisions in a way that either 
expands or minimizes Miller’s reach.282  Therefore, state court judges are 
equipped with the “tools” necessary to give substantive meaning to the 
Court’s vision of juvenile rehabilitation, and the ability to ensure that such 
decisions are applied even-handedly.283 
Executive actors also share the responsibility of upholding “the law of 
the land” because of the important role they play within the administration 
of the juvenile justice system.284  Considering Miller’s mandate on 
individualized sentencing, executive state actors are uniquely situated 
because of “the executive branch’s agility and discretion.”285  Accordingly, 
before a juvenile’s case ever reaches a judge, state prosecutors first have the 
responsibility of charging and then subsequently sentencing the juvenile 
offender.286  A prosecutor basically “lives” with the case starting at its 
inception and therefore, has the power to not only control the direction the 
case travels, but also, to ensure that the juvenile is given a fair and just 
process. 
Specifically, prosecutors often have the discretion of deciding whether 
a juvenile offender will be transferred to the adult criminal system.287  This 
raises an immediate concern for a juvenile offender because most 
jurisdictions employ generally applicable penalty provisions, which means 
that in a jurisdiction mandating juvenile LWOP, the juvenile can be 
sentenced to LWOP without his or her age ever being considered.288  
Additionally, some states have no minimum age standards or rules 
restricting the age that a juvenile may be transferred to adult court.289  In 
 
280  Id. 
281  See id.; see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
282  See Drinan, supra note 184, at 793 (noting that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
found the Miller decision applied retroactively and that discretionary LWOP sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenders were unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights). 
283  See id. 
284  See id. 
285  See id. at 794. 
286  See id. 
287  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2473 (2012) (“Almost all jurisdictions allow some 
juveniles to be tried in adult court for some kinds of homicide.”). 
288  See id. 
289  See id. 
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some states, children as young as thirteen are transferred to the adult 
criminal system, where they not only sit in jail alongside adult criminal 
offenders, but are also tried and sentenced before judges who deal with 
adult criminal offenders on a daily basis.  As a result, these children are 
prevented from receiving the very benefits or rights upon which the juvenile 
justice system was created. 
Moreover, when deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to the adult 
criminal system, prosecutors are sometimes not required to take the child’s 
age or maturity into account; in some jurisdictions, prosecutors are even 
able to unilaterally decide whether to file the case directly in adult court 
without providing the juvenile with a hearing.290  This legal practice is 
known as “direct file,” and it allows prosecutors to exclusively make the 
decision of where to file the case, allowing the prosecutor to act as both 
judge and jury.291  Although the issues of transferring juvenile offenders to 
the adult criminal court system will be discussed below, the fact that 
prosecutors have the sole discretion of immediately and expeditiously 
controlling this process from the get-go, evidences the enormous amount of 
power they have, where they not only control—and thus, limit—the number 
of transfers, but also, are in an especially valuable position to protect the 
life of the juvenile offender. 
Florida’s “direct file” system highlights the need for change in the 
juvenile justice system.292  This Note uses Florida to illustrate the many 
issues surrounding the “direct file” system that is employed by many other 
states nationwide.293  Specifically, and perhaps most shockingly, according 
to a study conducted by The James Madison Institute, since 2009, more 
than 12,000 children were tried as adults in Florida.294  This study analyzed 
the effects of keeping children within the juvenile justice system and 
concluded that sending children to adult court actually increases crime and 
 
290  Tchoukleva, supra note 21. 
291  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474 n.16 (listing Florida, Michigan, and Virginia); see, e.g., Sal 
Nuzzo et al., Policy Brief, No Place for A Child: Direct File for Juveniles Comes at A High Cost; Time 
to Fix Statutes, JAMES MADISON INST. at 1 (Feb. 2016), http://www.jamesmadison.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016-Juvenile-Justice-Policy-Brief-21.pdf [hereinafter Policy Brief, JAMES MADISON 
INSTITUTE]; see also Direct File Wrong for Juvenile Offenders, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 26, 2015), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article41433630.html. 
292  See generally Policy Brief, JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE, supra note 291; see also Miller, 132 
S. Ct. at 2473–75 (discussing the jurisdictions that transfer juveniles to adult court). 
293  This Note uses Florida as an example because Florida currently has the highest number of 
adult transfers of any state, and thus, is the state that requires the most critical examination); see e.g., 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474 n.16 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557(1) (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 712A.2(a)(1) (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1–241(A), 16.1–269.1(C), (D) (West 2012)). 
294  See Policy Brief, JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE, supra note 291, at 1; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2473–75 (discussing the jurisdictions that transfer juveniles to adult court). 
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reduces public safety.295  Youth who are transferred to the adult criminal 
justice system are more likely to recidivate than those retained in the 
juvenile justice system.296  The evidence overwhelmingly displays that 
keeping children in the juvenile justice system results in children being 
treated through a variety of programs such as, diversion, probation, 
redirection, and non-secure detention.297  Ultimately, the study implicitly 
confirmed the Supreme Court’s principle behind treating children 
differently.  It determined that the juvenile justice system is more effective 
in promoting rehabilitation than the adult criminal justice system.298  For 
example, a juvenile offender who is transferred to the adult criminal system 
is approximately 34% percent more likely to be rearrested for a felony than 
a juvenile offender who had stayed in the juvenile justice system.299 
Even more compelling, the study found that economically, a 
reinvestment strategy directed at keeping children within the juvenile 
justice system, while offering them rehabilitative and educational programs, 
would result in savings of about $12 million.300  Although the reinvestment 
program would not immediately produce significant fiscal savings, these 
alternative rehabilitative and educational programs would ultimately result 
in long-term savings.301  In emphasizing the competing interests between 
juvenile offenders and the public safety, this realignment strategy would 
focus on creating a system designed to address a juvenile offender’s 
developmental challenges and opportunities.302  Accordingly, juvenile 
offenders would be examined under a variety of Department of Juvenile 
Justice assessment tools, such as the Positive Achievement Change Tool 
Assessment and the Disposition Matrix.303  The results from these 
assessments would help determine the level of supervision and the types of 
rehabilitative programs that the child will need.304  Therefore, the program 
would cater to those children who need more intensive supervision and 
rehabilitative services than others.305  As a result, these children will be 
supervised much closer than they would have been in the adult criminal 
justice system, resulting in less recidivism, and in effect, more productive 
 
295  See Policy Brief, THE JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE, supra note 291, at 2–3. 
296  Id. at 4. 
297  Id. at 5. 
298  Id. at 6. 
299  Id. 
300  Id. 
301  See Policy Brief, JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE, supra note 291, at 6. 
302  Id. 
303  Id. at 9. 
304  Id. 
305  Id. 
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members of society.306 
Florida’s realignment strategy is consistent with the principles that the 
Court illustrated in Miller.  Although the individualized consideration 
expressed in Miller runs contrary to the precedent in which it relied, and 
serves as a double-edged sword against juveniles, the use of individualized 
considerations in Florida’s realignment procedure seems appropriate and 
effective.  This strategy embraces everything the Court has expressed over 
the past decade in relation to how “kids are different.”  It does not limit 
itself to only addressing issues of sentencing or rehabilitation.  Instead, it 
focuses on the entire situation: from the moment the juvenile offender 
enters the juvenile justice system, throughout the legal proceedings, and 
then at the end, when the juvenile is either sentenced, placed in in 
probation, or is order to receive services.  Additionally, this strategy focuses 
on providing juveniles with the hope that someone else is “rooting for 
them,” while also providing a realistic and viable opportunity for change 
and growth.307  Here, “good behavior and character improvement” are not 
immaterial; instead, they are completely relevant.308  Therefore, this 
program effectively balances society’s concerns with that of a juvenile 
offender’s, which, as mentioned above, was the focus of our nation’s first 
juvenile courts. 
Moreover, in Miller, the Court compared the discretion that judges 
have in transfer hearings with the discretion judges have at sentencing.309  
In doing so, the Court briefly addressed the issue of transferring juvenile 
offenders to the adult criminal system and acknowledged the “key moment 
for the exercise of discretion is the transfer.”310  It noted that judges often 
determine whether to transfer a juvenile based on limited information 
because  judges usually do not know what they will learn about the offender 
or the case over the course of the proceeding.311  Interestingly enough, 
however, the Court noted that when granting a transfer, some judges will do 
so based on the fact that the judge believes the juvenile deserves a “much 
harsher sentence than he would receive in juvenile court.”312  The Court 
 
306  Id. (noting how more than seventy-two percent of juveniles transferred to the adult justice 
system are placed on adult probation, does nothing to protect society because in the adult system, 
probation has very little rehabilitative elements, and offenders are usually not supervised strictly). 
307  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (LWOP “means a denial of hope; that good 
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in 
store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.”). 
308  Id. 
309  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012). 
310  See id. 
311  See id. (This refers only to those jurisdictions that allow for transfer hearings). 
312  Id. at 2475. 
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observed that judges often use their subjective judgment in their rulings.313  
In fact, the Court made this distinction in defending against permitting 
judges from making individualized considerations about the child at the 
transfer hearing.314 
So, why is an individualized consideration appropriate at a sentencing 
hearing, yet inappropriate at a transfer hearing when the same 
rationalizations exist in both situations?  In its analysis, the Court in Miller 
appears to be undermining this idea, where it explained the risk associated 
with a child being transferred to the adult system unfairly and 
disproportionately.315  Despite the Court’s attempt to distinguish the two 
situations, it nevertheless concluded that the “discretion available to a judge 
at the transfer stage cannot substitute for discretion at post-trial sentencing 
in adult-court.”316  The Court somehow rationalized that permitting a 
judge’s discretion would be better served at a sentencing hearing, which is 
the last and final stage of the trial process available to an offender.317  
However, this can hardly be seen as a “better substitution,” when it is “the 
last and final stage,” and where the only correction that can be made is at 
the appellate level. 
This is one of the most prevalent issues facing juvenile offenders all 
over the country today.  It is an issue that must be addressed and abolished 
in totality.  As the Court in Miller conceded, judges will inject their own 
subjective reasoning into their decisions despite the lack of information 
available to them.318  There is no evidence that a judge who uses his or her 
subjective reasoning in a transfer hearing, where there is limited 
information, will not do so again at a sentencing hearing. Therefore, 
individualized considerations serve no purpose in the realm of sentencing 
juvenile offenders. 
Finally, Governors can also play a role in bringing state practice into 
compliance with the Supreme Court’s view on treating juveniles differently 
by using their “obligation to exercise mercy where it is appropriate,” which 
is also known as the clemency power.319  Governors could potentially 
appoint “Miller Commissions,” whose charge would be: (1) [T]o identify 
all state inmates affected by the . . . Miller decision; (2) identify a range of 
appropriate sentences for such inmates; and (3) to make recommendations 
 
313  See id. 
314  See id. 
315  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
316  See id. 
317  See id. 
318  See id. at 2475. 
319  Drinan, supra note 184, at 794. 
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to the governor regarding each inmate and what new sentence may be 
appropriate in light of the Miller sentencing factors. 320  In effect, this would 
allow the executive branch to remedy several problems all at once.321 
Governors would be able to reach cases the courts cannot, ensure that 
federal law is applied even-handedly, and to avoid the “piecemeal nature of 
failed legislative attempts and wildly unpredictable court outcomes,” all 
while providing juvenile inmates relief in an expeditious manner.322 
Accordingly, states have the power to effectively balance the public 
safety concerns with the need to treat these offenders fairly and 
proportionately.323  In reality, abolishing LWOP only means that states will 
be providing these offenders, who were sentenced to LWOP as children, 
with a possibility—not a guarantee—of being released within their 
lifetime.324  Despite the concerns surrounding the juvenile justice system, 
the states are in a unique position to take the lead and revise their 
sentencing practices to exhibit a growing consensus among the states and 
eventually align the U.S. with international norms.325  However, in order to 
ensure that a meaningful effect is given to the Supreme Court’s vision of 
juvenile rehabilitation and the “kids are different” principle, states must 
consider a “complete overhaul of juvenile incarceration” altogether.326  
Given all that we know about how “kids are different,” states can no longer 
turn a blind eye; states are now equally responsible for ensuring that 
juvenile offenders are given the opportunity to mature and reform, as well 




The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller signaled another one of the 
Court’s minimalistic approaches towards redefining our nation’s juvenile 
justice system within the last decade.  Despite the Supreme Court’s most 
recent ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the decision in Miller, 
nevertheless failed to account for other aspects affecting the juvenile justice 
system and those juvenile offenders who can still potentially face LWOP 
sentences.  This decision not only runs afoul to its prior decisions in Roper 
 
320  See id. 
321  Id. 
322  Id. 
323  See Montgomery v. Louisiana, Brief of the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and 
Justice and the Criminal Justice Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at 15 n.37 (2015). 
324  See id. 
325  See The Sentencing Project, supra note 178. 
326  See Drinan, supra note 184, at 788–89. 
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and Graham, but also to the penological goals for punishment and from a 
comparative law perspective.  The decision in Miller detoured around the 
principle that “kids are different,” and that children have a “diminished 
capacity that makes them less culpable” than adults.  Consequently, states 
were left to interpret Miller’s mandate differently, which in turn, resulted in 
similarly situated children being sentenced very differently.  Our juvenile 
justice system has experienced a bumpy ride in the United States. 
However, this is not dispositive of the Court’s ability to clarify its 
decision in Miller and foreclose on the issues surrounding the juvenile 
justice system once and for all.  The most important issue relating to 
prohibiting juvenile offenders from being sentenced to LWOP begins with 
the issue of transferring juveniles to adult court.  Transferring juvenile 
offenders to the adult criminal system serves little-to-no purpose and 
considering the alternatives available, there should never be such an 
“extraordinary circumstance” justifying a juvenile offender’s transfer to the 
adult criminal system; especially before other alternatives have been 
explored.  Additionally, it is extremely compelling that the United States is 
one of the only countries in the world that does not prohibit, and still 
sentences, juvenile offenders to LWOP.  By emphasizing the importance of 
parole boards and abolishing the transfer of juveniles to adult court, the 
Court could’ve satisfied the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment, and more importantly, followed the principle it has repeatedly 
emphasized in its decisions over the past decade: that children should be 
and will be treated differently and proportionately within the juvenile 
justice system of the United States. 
 
